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Perception is an active inferential process in which prior knowledge
is combined with sensory input, the result of which determines the
contents of awareness. Accordingly, previous experience is known
to help the brain “decide” what to perceive. However, a critical
aspect that has not been addressed is that previous experience can
exert 2 opposing effects on perception: An attractive effect, sensi-
tizing the brain to perceive the same again (hysteresis), or a repul-
sive effect, making it more likely to perceive something else
(adaptation). We used functional magnetic resonance imaging and
modeling to elucidate how the brain entertains these 2 opposing
processes, and what determines the direction of such experience-
dependent perceptual effects. We found that although affecting our
perception concurrently, hysteresis and adaptation map into distinct
cortical networks: a widespread network of higher-order visual and
fronto-parietal areas was involved in perceptual stabilization, while
adaptation was conﬁned to early visual areas. This areal and hier-
archical segregation may explain how the brain maintains the
balance between exploiting redundancies and staying sensitive to
new information. We provide a Bayesian model that accounts for
the coexistence of hysteresis and adaptation by separating their
causes into 2 distinct terms: Hysteresis alters the prior, whereas
adaptation changes the sensory evidence (the likelihood function).
Keywords: adaptation, Bayesian model, functional magnetic resonance
imaging, hysteresis, perceptual memory
Introduction
Perception not only depends on currently available sensory
information, but also strongly on previous experience (Fecteau
and Munoz 2003; Schwartz et al. 2007). For example, in the
waterfall illusion, prolonged exposure to one direction of
motion causes subsequently viewed stimuli to appear moving
in the opposite direction (Purkinje 1820). Such repulsive after
effects in perception are commonly attributed to neuronal
adaptation (Anstis et al. 1998). However, previous experience
can also have the opposite effect: After brief exposure to a
moving stimulus, the subsequent ambiguous probe appears to
move in the same direction (Kanai and Verstraten 2005), a
phenomenon known as “hysteresis” or “priming”. It has been
hypothesized that each effect serves a different computational
purpose: While adaptation could prepare the brain for the
uptake of new information (Barlow 1990), hysteresis might
stabilize percepts in the face of constantly changing low-level
stimulus features (Kleinschmidt et al. 2002). However, it is cur-
rently unknown what determines the direction of such
experience-dependent perceptual effects and how the brain en-
tertains these 2 opposing processes.
Here, we used multistable stimuli to address those ques-
tions as the effects of previous experience are most obvious
when stimulus evidence by itself is insufﬁcient to determine
perception. It is known that when multistable stimuli are pre-
sented intermittently, perception on any given trial depends
on hysteresis and adaptation (Pearson and Brascamp 2008).
We combined functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
with a paradigm in which we could investigate hysteresis and
adaptation concurrently, but dissociate them experimentally,
enabling us to probe whether both effects are also separable
in the human brain. We directly tested the predictions of 2
competing classes of models that explain hysteresis and adap-
tation either with a single mechanism (Gepshtein and Kubovy
2005), for example, neuronal adaptation (Orbach et al. 1963;
Blake et al. 2003; Chen and He 2004), or with 2 separate
mechanisms that, however, co-localize to the same early
sensory areas (Noest et al. 2007; Wilson 2007; Brascamp et al.
2009). We also focused on the question at which stage of
neural processing the 2 effects might occur, as hysteresis and
adaptation are either ascribed exclusively to early sensory
processing (Noest et al. 2007; Wilson 2007; Brascamp et al.
2009), or to interactions between early and higher-order pro-
cessing stages (Sterzer and Rees 2008; Gigante et al. 2009).
Our results refute models that deﬁne hysteresis and adap-
tation as resulting from the same neural process, as we found
that the 2 effects map into distinct, anatomically and hierarchi-
cally segregated cortical networks. Activity in higher-order
fronto-parietal areas and higher-order visual areas was related
to perceptual stabilization, with a central node in the dorsome-
dial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). In contrast to the widespread
network subserving hysteresis, adaptation was conﬁned to a
local node in early visual areas. We propose a Bayesian model
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that accounts for the coexistence of hysteresis and adaptation
by separating their causes into 2 distinct terms: Hysteresis alters
the prior, whereas adaptation changes the currently available
sensory information (the likelihood function). Keeping the
effects of previous experience separated in this way may allow
the brain to maintain the balance between exploiting redundan-
cies and staying sensitive to new information.
Materials and Methods
Subjects
Thirty healthy human subjects (mean age 25.1, range 21–38, 11
males) participated in the psychophysical part of this study. Twenty-
nine were right-handed, as assessed with the Edinburgh Inventory
(Oldﬁeld 1971). All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision, reported no history of neurological or psychiatric disease, and
gave written informed consent before participation, in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki. Twenty of these subjects (mean age
24.6, range 21–29, 7 males, all right-handed) also participated in the
fMRI study. Two further subjects participated in the fMRI study, but
their data were excluded due to technical artifact. Subjects received
monetary compensation for their participation.
Procedure and Stimuli
For the psychophysical experiments, stimuli were displayed on a
cathode ray tube monitor (HP p1230, resolution 1024 × 768, visible
screen size 30° × 22.9° at 75 cm distance, refresh rate 150 Hz). Inside
the scanner, a video goggle system was employed (Resonance Tech-
nology MR Vision 2000, resolution 800 × 600, visible screen size
30° × 22.5° at 1.2 m virtual distance, refresh rate 60 Hz). Stimuli were
generated using Matlab (R2007a, The MathWorks). Stimulus presen-
tation and response collection were controlled by Presentation soft-
ware (v13.1, Neurobehavioral Systems). All stimuli were presented on
a gray background (7.62 cd/m2); a red ﬁxation circle was continuously
present in the center of the screen (6.72 cd/m2).
To investigate perceptual hysteresis and adaptation, we used a
modiﬁed version of a paradigm introduced by Gepshtein and Kubovy
(2005) that allows the manipulation of both phenomena concurrently.
We presented sequences of stimuli with different degrees of multi-
stability: First, a bistable, rectangular dot lattice (800 ms), followed by
a tristable, hexagonal dot lattice (300 ms; Fig. 1). Both lattices were
aligned to the same orientation (henceforth referred to as 0°), but this
orientation was randomly varied from trial to trial, covering 90° in 1°
steps. The perceived orientation of these stimuli alternates spon-
taneously. For the ﬁrst bistable rectangular dot lattice, participants are
likely to perceive the lattice as a collection of illusory lines parallel to
0° or 90°. The likelihood to perceive a particular orientation can be
controlled by manipulating the evidence for that orientation, that is,
the aspect ratio (AR) of the dots (AR = Δ0/Δ90, where Δ0 and Δ90 cor-
respond to the interdot distances along 0° and 90°). Due to grouping
by proximity, perception of an orientation is more likely to occur
along the shortest interdot distance (Kubovy and Wagemans 1995).
Hence, when the interdot distance along the 0° orientation is shorter,
perception favors 0°, and subjects tend to perceive the dot lattice as
tilted to the right (AR <1, Fig. 1A). When the interdot distance along
the 90° orientation is shorter, perception favors 90°, and the dot
lattice is perceived as tilted to the left (AR >1). At AR = 1, P(0°) = P
(90°), and with interdot distance of 1°, the stimulus is fully bistable
(Kubovy and Wagemans 1995; Gepshtein and Kubovy 2005; Nikolaev
et al. 2010). We varied the likelihood to perceive 0° or 90° in the ﬁrst
dot lattice by manipulating the AR of the interdot distance in 7 steps
(1.3−1, 1.2−1, 1.1−1, 1, 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3). After the rectangular dot
lattice, we presented a tristable hexagonal dot lattice in which partici-
pants are equally likely to perceive 0°, 60°, and 120°. Hexagonal dot
lattices have the advantage of being highly instable (Kubovy and Wa-
gemans 1995), thus providing the highest sensitivity to the effects of
previous experience. Importantly, while varying the parameters of
the ﬁrst dot lattice, we kept the second lattice constant and maximally
instable. Critically, keeping the second stimulus constant and instable
throughout the trials enabled us to unravel how previous experience
determines perception of the current stimulus. Hysteresis can be in-
vestigated by assessing how perceiving an orientation in the second
stimulus depends on whether the same orientation was previously
perceived. Adaptation can be investigated by assessing how perceiv-
ing an orientation in the second stimulus depends on the amount of
evidence provided for that orientation in the ﬁrst stimulus. These
effects are similar to the direct (repulsive) and indirect (attractive) tilt
after effect originally described by Gibson and Radner (1937). We
exploited these sequential dependencies to independently deﬁne
Figure 1. Stimuli and experimental procedure. (A) Examples of rectangular dot lattices with different ARs, that is, interdot distances along the 0° and 90° orientations. Small
arrows indicate the 2 dominant percepts, 0° and 90°. The likelihood of perceiving a particular orientation depends on the shortest interdot distance. At AR = 1.3−1 (left panel),
when the interdot distance along the 0° orientation is shorter (see inset), perception favors 0° over 90°, and the dot array is perceived as tilted to the right (P(0°) > P(90°)). In
contrast, at AR = 1.3 (right panel), perception favors 90° over 0°, and the array is likely to be perceived as tilted to the left (P(0°) < P(90°)). At AR = 1 (middle panel), when 0°
and 90° orientations are equally likely, the stimulus is bistable (P(0°) = P(90°)). (B) On a given trial, we ﬁrst presented a rectangular dot lattice with varying AR for 800 ms
followed by a response screen on which subjects chose the perceived orientation. Then, a hexagonal dot lattice (with ﬁxed AR) was presented for 300 ms followed by a
response screen. A dynamic random dot mask was presented last to avoid carry-over effects to the next trial.
Cerebral Cortex May 2014, V 24 N 5 1153
brain areas reﬂecting the opposing effects of hysteresis and adap-
tation. One major advantage of this paradigm over the paradigms
used in previous studies (Kleinschmidt et al. 2002; Sterzer and Rees
2008; Raemaekers et al. 2009) is that it allows the separation of hyster-
esis from adaptation while measuring both phenomena concurrently.
Dot lattices (11.5° diameter) were made up from ordered spatial
arrangements of white Gaussian blobs (“dots”, 0.25° diameter), pre-
sented at the center of the screen. To ensure roughly equal dot
density for all ARs, the product of the interdot distances for 0° and
90° was kept invariant (∼1). To avoid interactions of the oriented
lines with the edges of the stimuli, we smoothed the total area of dot
lattices with a Gaussian (standard deviation [SD] 0.15). This gives the
impression that the lattice continues behind a virtual aperture (Niko-
laev et al. 2010). We also pseudorandomly jittered the exact position
of the dot lattice within the aperture (0–1.15°) to prevent that dots of
subsequent displays occupy systematically related portions of space.
After each presentation of a dot lattice, subjects chose the orien-
tation they had perceived from a screen displaying 4 alternative orien-
tations (0°, 90°, and the 2 diagonal orientations for the rectangular
dot lattices; 0°, 60°, 120°, and the unlikely 90° orientation for the hex-
agonal dot lattices). The position at which the alternatives appeared
(and thus the corresponding response button) was fully randomized
within and between trials. Subjects were instructed to be accurate, to
ﬁxate on a central ﬁxation dot (as ascertained by eye tracking), and to
report the ﬁrst perceived orientation in case the percept switched
during the presentation of an individual dot lattice. Note that subjects
were never required to assess whether they had seen the same orien-
tation in the 2 stimuli. To avoid after images and between-trial carry-
over effects, we presented a dynamic random dot mask (updated at
25 Hz) for 550 ms after the response to the hexagonal dot lattice.
Subjects completed 9 blocks of 70 trials. Pseudorandomization
assured that each AR occurred equally often during a block. The
experiments were conducted in a darkened, sound-attenuating
chamber. Constant head position was assured by the use of a chinrest
with forehead support. Subjects received 30 practice trials.
To ensure that none of the behavioral effects were ascribable to
eye movements, we monitored eye position (n = 26) using a binocular
infrared eye tracker in all psychophysical experiments (SR Research
Eyelink 1000, sampling rate 1000 Hz). The eye tracker was recali-
brated using a standard 9-point calibration procedure at the begin-
ning of each block.
Twenty of the subjects subsequently participated in the fMRI exper-
iment. To keep scanning within reasonable time limits, we reduced the
number of ARs to 3 (AR = 1, 1.1, and 1.2). Thus, rectangular dot lattices
would be either bistable or biased toward 90°. To speciﬁcally investi-
gate brain activity related to perception of the constant, instable hexa-
gonal dot lattice, we introduced trials in which the second stimulus
was omitted. This “partial trial design” makes it possible to separate
the hemodynamic response to the second stimulus from the convolved
responses to both stimuli (Ollinger, Corbetta, et al. 2001; Ollinger,
Shulman, et al. 2001). This enabled us to rule out that differences ob-
served for the contrast hysteresis versus no hysteresis were merely due
to differences arising for the ﬁrst stimulus (see below).
Subjects completed 10 blocks of 72 trials in 2 sessions. Each block
consisted of 30 trials with 2 stimuli, 30 trials with 1 stimulus, and 10
“null” baseline trials (during which only the ﬁxation cross was visible
on the display). To avoid long sequences of identical trial types, they
were presented in pseudorandom order, achieved by shufﬂing con-
ditions in sequences of 14 stimuli, 5 times per block. Furthermore,
the ﬁrst trial was randomly chosen from all available conditions and
later discarded from all analyses to eliminate T1 saturation artifacts in
the fMRI data. We added a baseline trial at the end of each block to
avoid curtailing the hemodynamic response for the last event in a
block. Subjects were instructed to respond accurately within 1.7 s.
This was practiced inside the scanner before the experiment started.
Parameters—fMRI
MRI data were acquired on a 3-T scanner (Siemens Allegra), using a
4-channel head coil. We acquired 216 volumes of 29 transversally or-
iented slices per run of functional (T2* weighted) echoplanar imaging
data (repetition time [TR] = 2.5 s, echo time [TE] = 30 ms, voxel size
3 × 3 × 3 mm, gap thickness 0.3 mm). Anatomical images were ac-
quired using a T1-weighted magnetization-prepared rapid gradient
echo (MPRAGE) sequence (160 slices, TR = 2.25 s, TE = 4.38 ms, voxel
size 1 × 1 × 1 mm). All sequences covered the whole brain.
Data Analysis—Psychophysics
Behavioral data were analyzed with a logistic regression using Gener-
alized Estimating Equations (GEE, Liang and Zeger 1986) in SPSS
(v17 and v18, SPSS, Inc.). GEE is an extension of the generalized
linear model (GLM) developed for the analysis of repeated-measures
designs (for an introduction see Hanley et al. 2003). Following Gepsh-
tein and Kubovy (2005), we restricted our analyses to the response
alternatives with equal likelihood at AR = 1, that is, cases were sub-
jects responded either 0° or 90° to the rectangular dot lattices and 0°,
60°, or 120° to the hexagonal dot lattices. Analyses using all response
alternatives yielded comparable results. Data were sorted by the
subject, block, and trial number. To account for the correlations
between successive trials, we used a working correlation matrix with
a ﬁrst order autoregressive relationship (Liang and Zeger 1986). Two
logistic regressions were computed. In the ﬁrst, we modeled the
responses to the ﬁrst stimulus using AR as a predictor. In the second,
we modeled the responses to the second stimulus using the AR of the
ﬁrst stimulus and responses given to the ﬁrst stimulus (R1) as predic-
tors. We excluded the interaction term since a previous model re-
vealed no signiﬁcant interaction between AR and R1 (Wald’s
χ2(1) = 0.251, P = 0.617).
Data Analysis—Eye Tracking
For ofﬂine analyses of the eye tracking data, temporal windows were
deﬁned from 200 ms before the stimulus onset until stimulus offset
(800 ms for stimulus and 1300 ms for stimulus 2). A trial was ex-
cluded from the analyses if a blink occurred within 100 ms either
before stimulus onset or after stimulus offset. We then calculated the
percentage of eye position samples falling into a square window
around the ﬁxation dot for 2 levels of precision (window size
1.5° × 1.5° or 2° × 2°). Repeated-measures analyses of variance were
run separately at each level of precision for stimulus 1 and stimulus 2,
with factors eye (left and right) and hysteresis (0–0° and 90–0°) to
control for the effect of ﬁxation stability on the hysteresis effect, and
with factors eye (left and right) and AR (1.3−1, 1.2−1, 1.1−1, 1, 1.1, 1.2,
and 1.3) to control for the effect of ﬁxation stability on the adaptation
effect.
Data Analysis—fMRI
MRI data were analyzed in Brain Voyager QX (v2.1, Brain Inno-
vation), SPSS, and Matlab using both the Brain Voyager Toolbox and
custom code. The ﬁrst 3 volumes of each functional run were ex-
cluded to prevent T1 saturation effects. Preprocessing included slice
scan time correction with cubic spline interpolation, 3-dimensional
motion correction using trilinear/sinc interpolation, and high-pass ﬁl-
tering (0.01 Hz). Functional and anatomical data were brought into
anterior commissure posterior commissure space using cubic spline
interpolation and then transformed into standard Talairach space (Ta-
lairach and Tournoux 1988) using trilinear interpolation. For the
whole-brain analyses, data were spatially smoothed with a Gaussian
kernel (8-mm full-width at half-maximum). To create inﬂated surface
reconstructions, the gray–white matter boundary in the structural
scans was segmented, reconstructed, smoothed and inﬂated (Krieges-
korte and Goebel 2001) separately for each hemisphere.
Blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) responses were esti-
mated using a deconvolution model in a random effects (RFX) GLM.
For each condition, we deﬁned appropriately placed series of 8 ﬁnite
impulse response (FIR) predictors (one per volume) to model the
20-s BOLD response following the onset of each trial. Contrasts were
run over the third and fourth predictors (corresponding to 5- and
7.5-s poststimulus), thus covering the peak of the BOLD response
while accounting for variability in the peak time in different subjects
and brain regions (Handwerker et al. 2004). To reduce the number of
voxel-by-voxel comparisons, we restricted the analyses by the use of
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a cortex mask based on the individual gray–white matter boundary.
This reduced the number of voxels to 47 405. For follow-up
region-of-interest (ROI) analyses, we extracted the mean deconvolved
time courses of the clusters identiﬁed in the whole-brain analysis per
subject from the unsmoothed data.
To identify cortical regions involved in perceptual hysteresis, we
deﬁned a GLM with hysteresis (2 stimuli trials where subjects re-
sponded 0° to both stimuli) and no hysteresis (2 stimuli trials where
subjects responded 90° to the ﬁrst stimulus and 0° to the second) as
independent predictors. Both predictors were modeled with a FIR set
comprising 8 poststimulus periods. To discard spurious carry-over
effects from perceiving 0° or 90° in the ﬁrst stimulus, we deﬁned 2
additional predictors for trials with only 1 stimulus: 1 for trials in
which subjects responded 0°, and 1 for trials in which subjects re-
sponded 90° (see below). Finally, we added 3 predictors of no inter-
est to account for variance from trials with 2 stimuli where subjects
chose one of the remaining orientations on the ﬁrst, second stimulus,
or both stimuli; trials with 1 stimulus where subjects chose a diagonal;
and trials where subjects failed to respond.
We created beta maps per subject for 2 contrasts: (hysteresis vs. no
hysteresis) and (0° vs. 90°). To reveal brain areas with signiﬁcant
activity changes related to hysteresis, we then contrasted (hysteresis
vs. no hysteresis) > (0° vs. 90°) in a second-level analysis. The com-
parison of (hysteresis vs. no hysteresis) with (0° vs. 90°) was essential
in this contrast as it guards the results against any BOLD differences
that are merely due to participants perceiving 0° versus 90° in the ﬁrst
stimulus without any hysteresis (however, virtually identical results
were observed for the simple contrast [hysteresis vs. no hysteresis]).
The contrast map was initially thresholded at a voxel level t(19) = 2.860
and subsequently submitted to statistical inference with a cluster size
threshold at P < 0.05 (5000 iterations), corrected for multiple compari-
sons. The resulting cluster size threshold was 263 mm3/297 voxels.
Since perceptual memory can only build up with the presentation of
the ﬁrst stimulus, solely areas showing a signiﬁcant BOLD response
to the ﬁrst stimulus (post hoc t-test on the mean of 0° and 90° one
stimulus trials, P < 0.05, uncorrected) were considered to be directly
involved in perceptual hysteresis.
To identify regions expressing adaptation, we deﬁned a new GLM
for the same set of data (and thus the same baseline) as above (A
single GLM incorporating both hysteresis and adaptation would have
been optimal. However, it was not possible to build a single RFX GLM
for both effects while maintaining the same statistical power, as some
subjects showed strong hysteresis effects on the high aspect ratios,
and thus, no predictor for some combinations of aspect ratio and no
hysteresis perception could be built for these subjects.). We regrouped
the trials into 6 new independent predictors (each modeled with the
FIR set comprising 8 poststimulus periods). Since adaptation depends
on the AR, we constructed one predictor per AR for 1 and 2 stimuli
trials, respectively. We also included a predictor of no interest for trials
where subjects failed to respond. We then created beta maps per
subject for the contrasts (AR = 1 vs. baseline), (AR = 1.1 vs. baseline),
and (AR = 1.2 vs. baseline) for trials with 2 stimuli and ran an F-test to
compare between the 3 conditions. The resulting map was initially
thresholded at a voxel level F2,38 = 3.244 and submitted to statistical
inference with the same statistical threshold as for the hysteresis con-
trast (cluster size thresholded at P < 0.05 [5000 iterations], corrected
for multiple comparisons). The resulting cluster size threshold was
749 mm3/783 voxels. For each of the clusters, we extracted the decon-
volved time courses per subject. Areas showing a signiﬁcant positive
BOLD response to the ﬁrst stimulus (post hoc t-test on the mean of 0°
and 90° one stimulus trials, P < 0.05, uncorrected) and a linear trend
(as assessed by linear trend analysis, Howell 2002, p. 408f) of the
peak BOLD response over the 3 ARs for the second stimulus were con-
sidered to be involved in perceptual adaptation. Note that a trend
analysis requires that the factor for which the trend is investigated is
signiﬁcant in the preceding omnibus F-test, but that the presence or
absence of a linear trend is statistically independent of this preceding
test. Thus, ROI analyses were statistically independent of the contrasts
performed for the whole brain.
Eye tracking was not available inside the scanner. However, to
assess whether eye movements could account for the observed
effects, we used a method introduced by Beauchamp (2003). This
method exploits the fact that major signal changes can be observed in
the eyeballs themselves during eye movements. Thus, differential eye
movements in different conditions can be assessed by comparing
signal changes in the eyeballs. We ﬁrst identiﬁed for each functional
run voxels with time course jumps ≥4 SD. The resulting maps were
averaged per subject. Based on the average maps, we then deﬁned
ROIs for each eyeball in each subject (mean number of voxels left
eye: 108.2, standard error (SE) 3.93; mean number of voxels right eye:
111.86, SE 2.79), and joined these ROIs into one ROI per subject. If
ROIs could not be identiﬁed this way, we deﬁned a sphere (radius 3
voxels, size 123 voxels) around the group-average peak voxel of the
respective eyeball. This was done for 6 eyeballs. ROIs could be
deﬁned for 19 subjects. These ROIs were used as control regions for
all other contrasts.
Results
Behavioral Results
Perception of the ﬁrst, rectangular dot lattice should follow
the Gestalt law of proximity such that the likelihood to per-
ceive an orientation depends on the shortest interdot distance.
We conﬁrmed this prediction in a logistic regression using the
AR as a predictor of the responses given to the ﬁrst lattice. As
shown in Figure 2A, the probability of responding 0° de-
creased as AR increased (Wald’s χ2 (1) = 111.880, P < 0.01,
Table 1). We also conﬁrmed bistability of the rectangular dot
lattice at AR = 1, as the probability to respond 0° or 90° was
close to the chance.
We then turned to the second stimulus, which was kept
constant and instable throughout the trials, enabling us to
unravel how previous experience determines perception. In
particular, to investigate the effects of hysteresis and adap-
tation on perception of the second dot lattice, we modeled
the responses to the second stimulus (R2) as a function of the
AR of the ﬁrst stimulus and the response given to the ﬁrst
stimulus (R1) in a logistic regression. As the AR of the second
stimulus does not favor a particular orientation, one would
not expect any differences in the likelihood to perceive a
particular orientation, unless the ﬁrst stimulus exerts an
effect onto the second one. We conﬁrmed this later scenario
as both AR and R1 signiﬁcantly predicted R2 (AR: Wald’s
χ2 (1) = 58.797, R1: Wald’s χ
2
(1) = 146.186, both P < 0.01,
Table 1). Figure 2B shows the carry-over effect from R1 to R2:
The black line in the ﬁgure depicts the likelihood that subjects
perceived 0° in the ﬁrst dot lattice and continued perceiving
0° in the second dot lattice, thus exhibiting perceptual hyster-
esis. The gray line shows the likelihood that subjects ﬁrst per-
ceived 90° and then switched to perceiving 0° in the second
stimulus. Importantly, the 2 lines run in parallel, showing that
perceptual hysteresis does not interact with, or depend on,
the AR of the ﬁrst stimulus. The vertical separation of the 2
lines reﬂects the size of the perceptual hysteresis effect, indi-
cating that subjects were likely to perceive the same orien-
tation in the ﬁrst and second lattice. The effect of adaptation
becomes apparent when comparing the slope in Figure 2A
with B: While the likelihood to respond 0° decreases with AR
for the ﬁrst stimulus, it increases with AR for the second
stimulus. Thus, the more likely subjects were to perceive 0° in
the ﬁrst dot lattice, the less likely subjects were to perceive 0°
in the second lattice. This inverse effect is characteristic of
adaptation. Interestingly, adaptation was even present for the
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orientations that were not explicitly reported. For instance, in
the black line in Figure 2B, adaptation to 90° is evident by the
positive slope (i.e. the inverse slope of Fig. 2A). However, on
these trials, subjects reported perceiving 0° in both stimuli.
This indicates that both 90° and 0° orientations are always
processed, regardless of whether they are consciously per-
ceived or not (Blake and Fox 1974; Hock et al. 1996; Gepsh-
tein and Kubovy 2005). All behavioral results could be
reproduced in the scanner (Table 1). Here, AR also signiﬁ-
cantly predicted whether subjects responded 0° or 90° on
trials with only one stimulus (Wald’s χ2 (1) = 78.286, P < 0.01,
Table 1). None of these effects were attributable to differences
in ﬁxation stability, as there was neither a signiﬁcant effect of
hysteresis nor AR in the eye tracking data (all P > 0.05, Green-
house–Geisser corrected).
Imaging Results
Having established that perceptual hysteresis and adaptation
are independently expressed in the behavioral response pat-
terns, we now turned to the brain imaging data to investigate
the cortical areas underlying each effect. To this end, we em-
ployed a logic that closely followed the analyses of the behav-
ioral data. To identify regions involved in hysteresis, we
contrasted trials in which subjects expressed hysteresis (sub-
jects reported twice the same percept, i.e. 0°) with trials in
which they did not express hysteresis (subjects reported a
perceptual switch, i.e. 90° followed by 0°). By analyzing only
trials in which perception of the second stimulus was 0°,
these conditions only differ in their history. However, due to
the sluggishness of the BOLD hemodynamic response, in
trials with 2 stimuli responses related to the ﬁrst one are con-
volved with responses to the second one, introducing the
potential confound that the differences between hysteresis
and no hysteresis merely arise from perceiving 0° or 90° in
the ﬁrst stimulus without any true difference at the level of
the second stimulus. In order to rule out this potential
concern, we contrasted 0° and 90° percepts on trials with
only 1 stimulus and subtracted this difference from the differ-
ence between hysteresis and no hysteresis trials in 2 stimulus
trials. Thus, the result of the contrast (hysteresis vs. no
hysteresis) > (0° vs. 90°) was matched for the percept and the
response to the second stimulus and was not confounded by
potential differences in perceiving or reporting 0° or 90° in
the ﬁrst stimulus. Figure 3 shows that hysteresis is expressed
in a distributed network of brain areas spanning ventral visual
areas (including bilateral fusiform gyrus), superior parietal
(bilateral intraparietal sulcus [IPS]), and frontal cortices
(right anterior insula, right presupplementary motor area
[pre-SMA], and right dmPFC). The time course of BOLD
signal change in these regions is displayed in Figure 3 and
illustrates that, in all regions, the absolute response on hyster-
esis trials was smaller than on no hysteresis trials. This
resembles repetition suppression (Grill-Spector et al. 2006),
which has been proposed to reﬂect an effect of top-down per-
ceptual expectations (Friston 2005; Summerﬁeld et al. 2008;
Todorovic et al. 2011).
While the previous results suggest a network of brain areas
involved in perceptual hysteresis, in the next analysis, we at-
tempted to tie the contribution of those regions more directly
to percept maintenance. To that end, we took advantage of
the interindividual variability in the size of the behavioral
Figure 2. Behavioral results. (A) Responses to the ﬁrst stimulus (logit). The negative
slope shows how the likelihood to perceive 0° decreases as a function of AR. At
AR= 1.3−1, subjects were more likely to perceive 0°, while at AR = 1.3, subjects
were more likely to perceive 90°. At AR = 1, the stimulus is bistable, (P(0°) = P
(90°)). (B) Responses to the second stimulus (logit) as a function of the AR of the
ﬁrst stimulus. In contrast to the responses to the ﬁrst stimulus, the likelihood to
perceive 0° now increases with AR. This inversion is the signature of adaptation. The
black line indicates the conditional probability to perceive 0° in the second stimulus
given that 0° was already perceived in the ﬁrst stimulus (hysteresis trials). The gray
line indicates the conditional probability to perceive 0° in the second stimulus after
perceiving 90° in the ﬁrst stimulus (no hysteresis trials). The vertical separation
between the 2 lines indicates the size of the hysteresis effect. Note that both lines
run parallel indicating that hysteresis and adaptation are 2 independent, additive
factors that determine perception. See Supplementary Figure S1 for the same results
displayed in percentage probability.
Table 1
Logistic regression analysis of the behavioral data of the psychophysical and fMRI experiments
Response Predictor β (log
odds)
SE β Wald’s
χ2
df P-value eβ (odds
ratio)
R1 Constant
aspect ratio
5.091 0.4966 105.087 1 <0.01 162.524
−4.924 0.4655 111.880 1 <0.01 0.007
R2 Constant
aspect ratio
R1
−4.399 0.4228 108.232 1 <0.01 0.012
2.509 0.3271 58.797 1 <0.01 12.287
2.623 0.2169 146.186 1 <0.01 13.776
R1 (fMRI) Constant
aspect ratio
7.293 0.9470 59.308 1 <0.01 1469.697
−6.789 0.8444 64.583 1 <0.01 0.001
R2 (fMRI) Constant
aspect ratio
R1
−6.923 .9151 57.230 1 <0.01 0.001
4.843 0.6738 51.665 1 <0.01 126.837
3.048 0.4237 51.774 1 <0.01 21.080
R1 (one
stimulus)
Constant
aspect ratio
6.550 0.7739 71.630 1 <0.01 698.995
−6.146 0.6946 78.286 1 <0.01 0.002
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hysteresis effect (log odds) and correlated this with the differ-
ence in activation between hysteresis and no hysteresis trials
for each brain region. Regions showing a difference between
conditions and a correlation with interindividual differences
in behavior are likely to be centrally involved in percept main-
tenance (Yarkoni and Braver 2010). From all the areas ident-
iﬁed in the hysteresis contrast, only the right dmPFC
positively correlated with the propensity to maintain
Figure 3. fMRI results hysteresis. Results of the contrast (hysteresis vs. no hysteresis) > (0° vs. 90°). (A) Sagittal view of the right dmPFC (the mesial aspect of Brodmann
Area 8) and the right pre-SMA, and deconvolved time courses. Note that although the dmPFC shows a negative time course, the absolute BOLD response is higher for no
hysteresis than for hysteresis trials. (B) Transversal view of bilateral IPS and respective deconvolved time courses. (C) Transversal view of the bilateral fusiform gyrus and
respective deconvolved time courses. (D) Transversal view of the right anterior insula and deconvolved time course. (E) Correlation between the size of the individual hysteresis
effect (log odds of R1) and the difference between the peak BOLD amplitude for hysteresis and no hysteresis trials in the right dmPFC. Error bars represent the standard error of
the mean, and coordinates are given in standard Talairach space. Results are overlaid on the Montreal Neurological Institute standard brain, in radiological convention (left is
right). Time axes are in TRs (1 TR = 2.5 s).
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perception across successive stimuli (Pearson’s r = 0.59,
P = 0.0058, Fig. 3E; all other P > 0.1).
To identify regions expressing adaptation, we searched for
areas that showed a linear effect of AR, as observed in the be-
havioral data. To that end, we sorted all trials with 2 stimuli
according to the AR of the ﬁrst stimulus. We identiﬁed voxels
showing a signiﬁcant difference between ARs and then tested
for a linear increase of the peak BOLD response as a function
of AR. This procedure was motivated by the following ration-
ale: For the ﬁrst stimulus, we parametrically modulated the
stimulus evidence for 0°, such that as AR increases from 1 to
1.2, evidence for 0° decreases. Assuming that neural adap-
tation is proportional to the amount of evidence for 0° in the
ﬁrst stimulus and that the response to the second stimulus re-
ﬂects the degree of adaptation, adaptation to 0° should de-
crease as AR increases. Thus, as 0° is the only orientation that
repeats in the second stimulus, the BOLD response to the
second stimulus should be lowest for AR = 1 (reﬂecting strong
adaptation to 0°) and highest for AR = 1.2 (reﬂecting weaker
adaptation to 0°). The only region exhibiting this proﬁle was
found in the left occipital cortex (Fig. 4, F1,19 = 12.672,
P = 0.002, η2 = 0.400), slightly dorsal from the occipital pole,
whose location (−17 −100 5) is in good agreement with the
localization of human V2/V3 by Shipp et al. (1995) and
Wohlschläger et al. (2005). This result was also obtained
when the ROI analyses were based on the same data as for
the hysteresis contrast, that is, only trials in which subjects re-
sponded 0° or 90° to the ﬁrst and 0° to the second stimulus
(F1,19 = 10.587, P = 0.004, η
2 = 0.358), and when we per-
formed the same analyses in left dorsal V2 and V3 of n = 17
subjects in which early visual areas were independently
deﬁned based on retinotopic mapping (left dorsal V2 effect of
AR: F1.880,30.083 = 3.798, P = 0.036, η
2 = 0.192, Greenhouse–
Geisser corrected; linear trend: F1,16 = 8.484, P = 0.010,
η2 = 0.347; left dorsal V3 effect of AR: F1.823,29.164 = 3.453,
P = 0.049, η2 = 0.177, Greenhouse–Geisser corrected; linear
trend: F1,16 = 8.591, P = 0.010, η
2 = 0.349). The effect was
speciﬁc to the second stimulus, as on trials with only one
stimulus, the area neither showed a signiﬁcant effect of AR
(Fig. 4B, F1.742,33.098 = 1.788, P = 0.186, η
2 = 0.086) nor a linear
trend (F1,19 = 3.104, P = 0.094, η
2 = 0.140). The location of this
area coincides with the representation of the lower right
quadrant of the visual ﬁeld, which exhibits the highest switch
rate in binocular rivalry (Chen and He 2003). The switch rate
in such stimuli is also thought to be due to neuronal
adaptation.
We ﬁnally investigated whether areas exhibiting hysteresis
and adaptation would also express the respective other effect.
To this end, we tested whether the areas expressing adap-
tation showed a difference between hysteresis and no hyster-
esis trials, and whether the areas expressing hysteresis
showed a linear effect of AR. To assure that our conclusions
were based on the same set of data, we used only the trials in
which subjects responded 0° or 90° to the ﬁrst and 0° to the
second stimulus for this analysis. None of the effects were sig-
niﬁcant, mirroring the behavioral results in which hysteresis
and adaptation also did not interact (no signiﬁcant linear
trend in hysteresis areas, all P > 0.2, Supplementary Fig. S2;
no signiﬁcant difference between hysteresis and no hysteresis
in V2/V3, P > 0.3, Supplementary Fig. S3). In line with the eye
tracking data from the psychophysical experiments, we found
that none of the effects could be accounted for by eye
movements, as we did not observe any signiﬁcant effect at
P < 0.05 in the control ROIs. Taken together, the areal and
hierarchical segregation of hysteresis from adaptation might
explain how the brain entertains 2 distinct processing modes
without mutual interference. This set of results ﬁts well with
the hypothesized functions of hysteresis and adaptation, as
stabilization can be more easily achieved in higher processing
stages in which neurons exhibit invariance to low-level fea-
tures, while the extraction of new information may require
the detailed and sensitive representation in early sensory pro-
cessing stages.
Modeling
Based on our behavioral and neuroimaging results, we devel-
oped a simple mathematical model that can account for the
independence of hysteresis from adaptation. We chose the
Bayesian framework as it explicitly takes into account the
Figure 4. fMRI results adaptation. The cluster showing a linear effect of AR
encompasses dorsal V2 and V3. (A) Group activity in the dorsal occipital cortex
overlaid on the retinotopic map of the left inﬂated hemisphere of a representative
subject (cps07) for whom retinotopic mapping was available. Light and dark gray
depict gyral and sulcal surfaces, respectively. White lines indicate the borders of early
visual areas shown in different colors. (B) Peak BOLD amplitude per AR on trials with
only 1 stimulus. There was no signiﬁcant effect of AR (F1.742,33.098 = 1.788,
P= 0.186, η2 = 0.086). (C) Peak BOLD amplitude per AR on trials with 2 stimuli.
The BOLD response linearly increases with AR (F1,19 = 12.672, P= 0.002,
η2 = 0.400), mirroring the behavioral adaptation effect. Error bars represent the
standard error of the mean, corrected for between-subject variability (Cousineau
2005; Morey 2008).
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inﬂuence of previous experience on what is currently per-
ceived. Here, perception is the result of an inference in which
the available sensory information (the likelihood) is combined
with previously acquired knowledge (the prior; Yuille and
Kersten 2006). Our model accounts for perception of both the
ﬁrst and the second dot lattice in Bayesian terms. For both
stimuli, grouping into one of the dominant orientations (θ)
depends on the evidence (i.e. AR) in support of 0° and 90°
for the rectangular dot lattice, and 0°, 60°, and 120° for the
hexagonal lattice. According to Bayes’ rule we can write:
PðujARÞ/ PðARjuÞ  PðuÞ: ð1Þ
The probability of perceiving θ given AR is the product of the
likelihood of θ for a particular AR and the a priori knowledge
about the estimated variable θ. The maximum a posteriori es-
timate (MAP) is given by:
u
_
MAP ¼ arg max
u
½PðARjuÞ  PðuÞ: ð2Þ
The perceived orientation θ corresponds to the mode of the
posterior distribution (Eq. 2). If θ does not exactly match one
of the dominant orientations present in the lattice, the subject
chooses the response alternative that is closest to the per-
ceived orientation, since we are using a forced choice task.
We base our model on minimal assumptions about the dis-
tributions underling the likelihood and the prior probability
of each of the 2 stimuli. For the rectangular lattice, we assume
that the prior distribution is uniform across θ (Fig. 5A), reﬂect-
ing that each orientation between 1° and 180° appears with
equal likelihood throughout the experiment. Alternatively, a
Gaussian distribution can be used without qualitatively chan-
ging the results. The likelihood of θ is modeled as a mixture
of Gaussian distributions centered at 0° and 90° for the ﬁrst
stimulus and at 0°, 60°, and 120° for the second stimulus. At
AR = 1, the SDs are equal and set to 15°, concurring with pre-
vious psychophysical studies showing that adaptation is still
present for subsequently presented dot lattices with orien-
tations falling 15° apart (Gepshtein and Kubovy 2005). When
the evidence in favor of one of the dominant orientations is
strong (i.e., the interdot distance is short), the corresponding
Gaussian has a low SD and high amplitude, while weaker evi-
dence leads to a corresponding high SD (low amplitude). For
the ﬁrst stimulus, SD 0°/SD 90° = AR. As a consequence, AR
determines the relative difference between the peaks of the
likelihood distribution (Fig. 5B). Both the likelihood and
prior distributions are wrapped around the circumference of a
circle of unit radius to give a proper representation of
orientation.
Following our results showing that hysteresis and adap-
tation concurrently, but independently, determine perception
of the second stimulus both in behavior and in the brain, we
model these 2 processes independently. We implement hys-
teresis by increasing the prior distribution around the per-
ceived orientation θp of the ﬁrst stimulus (Fig. 5A). The new
prior is a mixture of a uniform distribution and a Gaussian
centered at θp:
PðuÞ ¼ ru þ rp N ðup; SDÞ; ð3Þ
where rθ is the proportion of random samples corresponding
to an orientation θ and rp is the proportion of responses
based on the dominant grouping orientation θp. Together,
both the ratio rp/rθ and SD determine the strength of the hys-
teresis effect (a ratio of rp/rθ = 0.08 matches our empirical
data). As a result, the estimate of θ for the second stimulus is
attracted toward the already perceived value (0° or 90°), re-
ﬂecting the increased probability to perceive the same orien-
tation again. However, changes in the prior distribution do
not lead to repulsive perceptual after effects (Stocker and Si-
moncelli 2006). Instead, adaptation can be accounted for by
assuming that it changes the available sensory evidence and
thus the likelihood function of the second stimulus. We rely
on a simple model in which sensory evidence for the adapted
orientation is reduced upon repetition. This is plausible given
that orientation speciﬁc reductions in neuronal activity are fre-
quently reported in studies on neuronal adaptation (e.g. Car-
andini et al. 1998). When presented in isolation, the
hexagonal dot lattice contains equal stimulus evidence for all
3 dominant orientations, captured by 3 Gaussian distributions
with equal SD (15°). The reduction in sensory evidence as a
result of adaptation was implemented by changing the SD of
the Gaussian centered on 0° as a linear function of the AR of
the ﬁrst stimulus:
SD ¼ ðm ARþ bÞ  SD; ð4Þ
Figure 5. Schematic representation of the Bayesian model. (A) Perception of the ﬁrst stimulus induces hysteresis by altering the prior distribution of the second stimulus. For
the ﬁrst stimulus, the prior is described by n=300 samples from a uniform distribution (black). It then increases around the perceived orientation θ (0° in this example) for the
hexagonal lattice (gray). This heightens the probability to see the same orientation again. (B) An example of the likelihood of θ for the rectangular dot lattice at AR= 1.3−1.
Here, evidence in favor of the 0° orientation is larger than evidence for 90°. For each trial, we estimate the likelihood based on n=300 samples for each Gaussian. (C) An
example of the likelihood of θ for the hexagonal lattice. The likelihood is composed of 3 Gaussians centered at 0°, 60°, and 120°. However, evidence for 0° present in (B) lowers
the likelihood of the 0° orientation in the second dot lattice, thus inducing perceptual adaptation.
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where m × SD is the slope of the linear equation and b × SD is
the intercept. With m = 0.4 and b = 0.6923, this reproduces the
reduced probability to perceive the 0° orientation in the
second stimulus (Fig. 5C). When put together, our mathemat-
ical model implementing hysteresis and adaptation as inde-
pendent factors replicates the pattern of behavioral results for
rectangular and hexagonal dot lattices (Fig. 6). In the absence
of adaptation, the 2 lines in Figure 6B are completely ﬂat
while maintaining their vertical separation (i.e. the hysteresis
effect). In the absence of hysteresis, the 2 lines collapse into
one, while still being modulated by AR (i.e. the adaptation
effect).
Discussion
Our results reveal that perceptual hysteresis and adaptation
are functionally dissociated in the human brain. Whereas a
widespread network of frontal, parietal, and ventral occipital
brain areas is involved in hysteresis, BOLD responses follow-
ing the behavioral proﬁle of adaptation are only evident in ex-
trastriate cortex. Previous psychophysical and modeling work
have explained hysteresis and adaptation as resulting from
the same mechanism, either neuronal adaptation (Orbach
et al. 1963; Blake et al. 2003; Chen and He 2004), or a “per-
sistent bias” (Gepshtein and Kubovy 2005). The functional
division observed in our data refutes these interpretations.
Recent models that propose separate mechanisms for hyster-
esis and adaptation seem to account better for our results.
However, several of these models colocalize the mechanisms
for hysteresis and adaptation to the same early sensory area
(Noest et al. 2007; Wilson 2007; Brascamp et al. 2009), an
idea that also seems at odds with our data. We provide a
parsimonious alternative explanation of the coexistence
of hysteresis and adaptation within a Bayesian framework of
perception.
A Bayesian Account of Hysteresis and Adaptation
In the Bayesian framework, perception depends on the prob-
ability distribution of the available evidence (the likelihood
function) and on knowledge about the world (the prior). For
multistable stimuli, the likelihood function is multimodal, re-
ﬂecting the different possible interpretations (Sundareswara
and Schrater 2008). We perceive the posterior distribution,
which is again multimodal. Given the nonﬂat prior, one of its
peaks is maximal, and this perceptual interpretation gains
dominance. In our model, perception of one interpretation
adjusts the prior toward this interpretation, inducing hyster-
esis. We implement adaptation as a change in the likelihood
function (i.e., the sensory evidence), reﬂecting that neurons
show orientation speciﬁc reductions in responsiveness to re-
peated stimuli. Thus, the Bayesian framework is compatible
with a dissociation between hysteresis and adaptation in
neural space: One network computes the prior, whereas
another, sensory network changes the likelihood function.
The Cortical Network Expressing Hysteresis
Many current Bayesian models of brain function envision per-
ception as Bayesian inference and propose that this involves
higher-level brain areas generating predictions (priors),
which are then tested in lower, sensory areas (Mumford 1992;
Rao and Ballard 1999; Friston 2005; cf. Summerﬁeld and Koe-
chlin 2008). Accordingly, our contrast (hysteresis vs. no hys-
teresis) should reveal higher-level brain areas involved in the
generation and sensory areas involved in testing of a predic-
tion against the incoming evidence. In our paradigm, the
sensory feature for which a prior was generated and which
was perceptually stabilized was the orientation of the dot lat-
tices. Several of the areas we have identiﬁed are indeed pro-
cessing orientation, in particular, the fusiform gyrus (Orban
et al. 1997) and the IPS (Faillenot et al. 1999, 2001; Shikata
et al. 2001). Furthermore, neurons in the IPS participate in
grouping dots into oriented lines (Yokoi and Komatsu 2009),
which is another basic operation required to perceive orien-
tation in our stimuli. These areas are thus prime candidates
for testing predictions against incoming evidence, showing
BOLD repetition suppression for repeating percepts (the func-
tional interpretation of BOLD repetition suppression is still
under investigation, as it can represent top-down facilitation
(resulting, e.g., in a reduced prediction error), sharpening of
representations, and/or neural fatigue (Grill-Spector et al.
2006)). Regarding the higher-order areas, it has been pro-
posed that perceptual hysteresis might be closely linked to
working memory (Maier et al. 2003; Sterzer and Rees 2008),
which would not be predicted by a Bayesian account. The
pre-SMA (Petit et al. 1998) and also the IPS (Todd and Marois
2004) have been shown to be active in working memory
tasks. However, the remaining areas do not show strong
overlap with regions that are speciﬁcally involved in working
memory for orientations, in particular because of the relative
lack of lateral frontal activity in our study (Cornette et al.
2001, 2002). This might be explained by the fact that hyster-
esis is a form of implicit memory, whereas working memory
Figure 6. The Bayesian model reproduces the behavioral results. (A) Responses to
the ﬁrst stimulus following a Monte Carlo simulation with 2000 iterations (logit). As
for the behavioral results shown in Figure 2, the likelihood to perceive 0° in the ﬁrst
stimulus decreases as a function of AR. (B) Responses to the second stimulus as a
function of the AR of the ﬁrst stimulus, following a Monte Carlo simulation with 2000
iterations (logit). The black line shows hysteresis trials (model favored the 0°
orientation in both stimuli), the gray line shows no hysteresis trials (model favored
90° in the ﬁrst stimulus and 0° in the second stimulus). The model replicates the
increasing likelihood to perceive 0° with AR as well as the separation between the
hysteresis and no hysteresis trials.
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is explicit. Importantly, Bayesian inference in perception is
implicit. The IPS (Corbetta and Shulman 2002), pre-SMA (Fox
et al. 2006), and the right anterior insula (Sridharan et al.
2008; Eckert et al. 2009) are also implicated in the control of
top-down attention. Kanai and Verstraten (2006) have shown
in a perceptual memory paradigm employing ambiguous
motion that if attention is distracted during the presentation
of the ﬁrst stimulus or even in the blank period before the
presentation of the second stimulus, perceptual stabilization
fails. Thus, top-down attention seems to be essential to in-
stantiate perceptual memory. In a Bayesian framework,
spatial attention can be understood as a prediction of where a
particular stimulus (or percept) will appear (Chikkerur et al.
2010). A test or update of the prior would then evoke transi-
ent activity in these areas, as has been found for perceptual
switches in investigating binocular rivalry (Lumer et al. 1998)
and apparent motion (Muckli et al. 2002; Sterzer et al. 2002;
Müller et al. 2005). Finally, the only region in the network ex-
pressing perceptual hysteresis showing a correlation with the
individual size of the hysteresis effect was the right dmPFC.
This highlights its central involvement in perceptual hyster-
esis. It is likely that this area generates predictions about the
upcoming stimulus, which are then tested in the remaining
areas, an interpretation that concurs with previous studies
showing that the dmPFC is involved in generating predictions
under uncertainty (Volz et al. 2003).
Hysteresis trials entailed repetitions of both percepts and
choices. Thus, it could be argued that the pattern of BOLD
repetition suppression we observed for hysteresis trials re-
ﬂects choice repetition. Previous studies implicate areas
within the dorso- (Heekeren et al. 2008) and ventrolateral pre-
frontal cortices (Race et al. 2008) in abstract perceptual
decision making. However, we did not observe differences
between hysteresis and no hysteresis trials in these regions in
our whole-brain analyses or in further ROI analyses (Sup-
plementary Material). The lack of activation in areas systema-
tically implicated in abstract perceptual decision making
appears incompatible with the idea that the repetition sup-
pression observed for hysteresis versus no hysteresis trials re-
ﬂects repetition suppression for choices in a decision-making
network.
Further analyses of the reaction times using a diffusion
model of decision making (Ratcliff 1978) conﬁrmed that the
hysteresis effect in our study was most probably perceptual
and not due to a decisional bias (Supplementary Material), as
hysteresis was best explained by a change in the drift rate,
that is, the speed of evidence accumulation, which is thought
to capture perceptual effects (Voss et al. 2004). Interestingly,
a higher drift rate may also explain the lower BOLD responses
in hysteresis than in no hysteresis trials. In particular, the
earlier crossing of the decision bound in the hysteresis when
compared with the no hysteresis condition may be reﬂected
in an earlier peak in neural activity, and thus a lower BOLD
response, as the BOLD signal reﬂects the integral of neural
activity over time (James and Gauthier 2006). However, the
difference in the drift rate cannot explain our full set of
results, because we also ﬁnd areas that directly code for orien-
tation and do not represent the drift rate itself (Gold and
Shadlen 2007). Thus, the change in the drift rate may be a
component of perceptual hysteresis, but cannot explain it
alone. To further elucidate the relationship of percepts and
choices, future studies will be needed that directly contrast
the brain areas involved in perceptual hysteresis with those
involved in choice repetition.
A Local Network Expressing Adaptation
In contrast to the widespread activation observed for hyster-
esis, adaptation was only evident in a portion of early extra-
striate cortex, corresponding to dorsal areas V2/V3. Areas V2/
V3 contain orientation-tuned neurons (Felleman and Van
Essen 1987; Levitt et al. 1994). Importantly, these neurons
also respond to dots that are perceptually bound into oriented
lines (Peterhans et al. 2005) and more generally to illusory
contours (von der Heydt et al. 1984). Such binding is critical
for dot lattices to appear as having an orientation. The invol-
vement of an early sensory area ﬁts well with our Bayesian
model, in which adaptation does not change the prior, but
rather the representation of the available evidence. Moreover,
our ﬁnding that adaptation was evident at an earlier level of
the visual hierarchy than hysteresis meshes well with the
observation that adaptation in multistable dot lattices is orien-
tation speciﬁc, that is, the effect of AR on the second lattice
vanishes when the orientation of the main axis differs by
more than 15°. In contrast, hysteresis persists up to offsets of
30°, implying an involvement of regions with less-precise
orientation tuning (Gepshtein and Kubovy 2005). The differ-
ences in orientation speciﬁcity, and the fact that hysteresis
and adaptation display markedly different time constants
(Kanai and Verstraten 2005), further speak for a dissociation
of their underlying mechanisms.
The absence of a hysteresis effect in areas V2/V3 indicates
that, in our paradigm, predictions may not be tested against
sensory evidence in these early areas, but only at a later stage.
In fact, Figure 2B shows that hysteresis can overrule the
effects of adaptation. For example, it is possible to stabilize a
0° percept even at AR = 1.3−1, at which strong adaptation to 0°
should lead to a repulsive after effect. Thus, it is conceivable
that the output of areas V2/V3 serves as input for subsequent
processing stages, for example, the fusiform gyrus or IPS
where the hypothesis test is performed. In fact, if hysteresis
serves to stabilize percepts against constantly changing low-
level stimulus features (Kleinschmidt et al. 2002), larger re-
ceptive ﬁelds of higher visual areas are advantageous when
compared with small receptive ﬁelds in earlier visual areas
because they allow for a certain degree of invariance. Psycho-
physical evidence suggests that visual areas with larger recep-
tive ﬁelds may be involved in hysteresis by showing that
hysteresis is retinotopically organized, but extends beyond
the exact location where the ﬁrst stimulus was presented
(Knapen et al. 2009). However, current Bayesian theories of
brain function predict that the testing of predictions against
incoming evidence occurs throughout the visual hierarchy
(e.g., Friston 2005) and should thus also be evident in V2/V3.
Although signatures of prediction errors have been observed
in early visual areas, many of these studies have not reported
prediction errors on every level of the hierarchy (Fang et al.
2008; den Ouden et al. 2009; Alink et al. 2010). We thus
suggest that the signatures of a perceptual hypothesis test
may be found in the brain areas that provide the information
that is most relevant for the task at hand, and not at every
stage of processing. Future studies could test this proposal
explicitly, by varying the visual features that are relevant for
perceptual decisions about identical stimuli from trial-to-trial.
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Interestingly, our psychophysical data indicate a further
dissociation: Adaptation is present even if the adapting orien-
tation is not consciously perceived, whereas hysteresis does
depend on what was perceived in the previous stimulus. This
dichotomy might be explained by the fact that hysteresis in-
volves distributed processing, whereas adaptation is a purely
local phenomenon: Several current theories of conscious per-
ception predict that the spatial scale at which neuronal pro-
cessing occurs determines whether content enters awareness
or not (Dehaene et al. 2006; Melloni and Singer 2010;
Edelman et al. 2011).
Conclusions
Hysteresis and adaptation in multistable stimuli illustrate how
previous experience is used to guide perception: The brain
needs to cope with constantly changing, unreliable, or ambig-
uous input and exploiting the regularities of the world is an
efﬁcient strategy to achieve this goal. Recurring patterns are
informative, because they allow predicting what will happen
next, helping to stabilize perception in face of constantly
changing low-level stimulus properties. This is reﬂected by
the hysteresis effect. On the other hand, recurring patterns
are redundant and could be discarded from further proces-
sing, thus emphasizing the uptake of new information. This is
evident in the repulsive after effects resulting from adaptation.
The brain is optimized for both strategies. Our study shows
that hysteresis and adaptation map into 2 distinct, anatomi-
cally and hierarchically segregated cortical networks: While
higher-order fronto-parietal areas and higher-order visual
areas are involved in perceptual stabilization, adaptation is
conﬁned to a local node in early visual areas (V2/V3). This
result ﬁts well with the proposed functions of hysteresis and
adaptation, as stabilization can be more easily achieved at
higher processing stages where neurons exhibit invariance to
low-level features, while the extraction of new information re-
quires detailed and sensitive representations at earlier sensory
processing stages. This separation possibly endows the brain
with the ﬂexibility to switch between 2 modes, one that em-
phasizes the new, and another that exploits already available
information. Such ﬂexibility is crucial in a nonstationary
environment where one should always be prepared to predict
and to react to the unexpected.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material can be found at: http://www.cercor.oxford-
journals.org/
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